Discharge of Charge: Right in Personam
Section 279 of the National Land Code states about discharge by payment to registrar in cases of death, absence or disability of the chargor. It is interesting to note that entitlement to get discharge under this section only cover situation where the chargor intends to pay off his debt but not where the chargor had settled his debt in full fulfilling his part of contractual duty that arises from the loan facility agreement. This causes a lacuna in the context of discharge entitlement, where the code seems to neglect and overlook the right that should be enjoyed by the chargor.
Section 280 provides for memorialisation on discharge by payment. Several land-law authors commented that this section applies to circumstances laid down in section 279, and also where the chargor has paid the loan to the chargee but the chargee fails to provide a discharge.
I opt to disagree with that stand. Reading the section we can find that that is actually a continuation of section 279 and if the legislators had intended to include the latter situation they would have mentioned about it in section 279. Perhaps it is best and safe to accept that this section applies to situations prescribed in section 278 and 279.
Once the loan in question had been repaid in full in accordance with the facility’s terms and conditions by the chargor to the chargee (bank), the bank ‘will’ discharge the land. It should be pointed out that such act by the bank is not a statutory duty imposed by the law.
The law neither prescribes the bank to discharge the land once payment is settled or prescribe a time frame for discharge to be done. This duty however lies purely on a contractual basis. In practice, the annexure to the instrument of charge, namely Form 16A shall provide such undertaking.
Still, it must be noted that the bank as the provider of the annexure and other loan documents will not state the time frame for discharge. Due to this fact, once payment has been settled, a prudent chargor should inform the bank as soon as possible of his wishes that the land to be discharged.
The case of Sri Minal Construction Sdn Bhd v. Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2007] 9 CLJ 579 illustrates the point above mentioned. In general the facts is that the chargor had for three years finished servicing his loan but during that time the bank has still not discharge the land. The chargor had made some arrangements with respect to the land with a third party but was aborted due to land’s status of still under a registered charge. For the loss of business opportunity the chargee decided to slap the bank with a suit for failing to discharge the land within a reasonable time.
The court (Heliliah Yusof J) held that, “I find therefore that there was not express or implied contractual term nor statutory duty on the part of the defendant to prepare the discharge with a certain time frame. I also do not find a parallel tortious act attributed to the defendant. The matter of discharge had been assigned to the firm the services of which had been accepted by the plaintiff by deed and conduct. There was here a combination of causes that could not be described as the tortious act of the defendant bank. The bank’s responsibilities do not extend to extraneous and supervening events and even more so the conduct of the plaintiff in not communicating more information until a very late state. In other words the plaintiff’s own conduct vis-à-vis the defendant bank was instrumental in contributing towards the alleged failure of the sale and purchase agreement for it could not be said that the defendant bank ought to have known what other purposes the document was required for, other than the fact that the defendant bank was to take steps to have the discharge effected.” The court dismissed the case with costs.
In my opinion, under a direct authority of the law the judgment above is proper in its own sphere of facts, circumstances and evidence. However, what if the chargor had informed the bank of the situation and it is the bank is the one who lags in its action to discharge? What is the best cause of action to be taken against the bank?
As stated above, there is no express statutory provision that imposes duty to discharge to a chargee after settlement of payment. In this situation the chargor has to seek remedy from the court as was granted in the case of Eng Ah Mooi v Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation [1983] CLJ 144 (Rep) [1983] 1 CLJ 127, where the court explained that a charge is not irredeemable.
The court stated in its own word that,“Just as a mortgage is not irredeemable, likewise a charge is not undischargeable. Under English law a mortgagee or any person interested in the mortgaged property has the right to demand the mortgagee to redeem the mortgage on tendering the amount of debt together with interest thereon due on the mortgage. Pearce v Morris [1869-70] 5 LR Ch App 227 at 230 & 231; see also 27 HLE, 3rd Edn., p. 232 paras 411 and 412. We see no reason to hold that this rule of English law is inapplicable to the present appeal. In our view this rule is applicable although a lot has been said elsewhere about the differences between the common law mortgage and a charge under the Torrens System… In essence both the common law mortgage and the charge under the National Land Code are legal encumbrances on the proprietary right of an owner.” Under this context, the above judgment is a most welcome judge-made law pronounced by Salleh Abas FJ (as he was then).
It is interesting to note that the judgment in the Eng Ah Mooi case seems to rival the doctrine of indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system where section 340(1) of the National Land Code provides that all registered interest shall be indefeasible. In the case of OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Bhd & Ors v. Lee Lee Fah & Ors & Another Appeal [2000] 1 CLJ 71 the court held that interest as owner and chargee is indefeasible unless there are evidence to their knowledge that there was fraud or misrepresentation or where the registration of the charge was obtained by forgery or where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired. It is clear that the exceptions provided in the judgment are the ones provided in section 340(2) of the Code. So, how would this matter fare? Should the indefeasibility doctrine reign supreme or should there be a window where it can be redeemed under the context of charge as in the Eng Ah Mooi case?
The answer can be arrived at the better understanding of the Torrens system practiced in Malaysia, emphasis added. In our applied system there is a difference between immediate indefeasibility and deferred indefeasibility. Immediate indefeasibility occurs when a person gets an indefeasible title immediately after registration (M&J Frozen Food v Siland Sdn Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 294). On the other hand a deferred indefeasibility occurs when the registered title and interest is challenged by a third party. The latter not the former is practised in the Malaysian system as was held in the case of Boonsom Boonyanit v Adorna Properties [1997] 2 MLJ 62.
Reverting to the before mentioned issue of whether there is clash between ‘Indefeasibility of Title’ and Eng Ah Mooi’s judgment, we can arrive at a conclusion that the charge can be redeemable or dischargeable simply because there is no third party involved in this matter as the party that seek remedy with regards to the discharge of charge is the registered proprietor of the land itself.
My personal conclusion would be that it may be safe to accept that there is no statutory remedy provided under the National Land Code for situation where chargor has settled his debt but chargee is inaction with regards to the discharge, and to accept that the only remedy available to the chargor is to seek court order. In my opinion the chargor’s entitlement to a discharge once payment has been made can be protected and safeguarded if the last part of section 280 be interpreted openly by the Malaysian courts.




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